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Abstract—Interference and traffic imbalance hinder the im-
proved system performance in heterogeneous ultra-dense net-
works. Network cooperation becomes a promising paradigm with
sophisticated techniques which can significantly enhance the per-
formance. In this article, a coalition game-theoretic framework
is introduced to characterize the cooperative behaviors, and thus
exploring these cooperative benefits and diversity gains. First, we
introduce the basis of the coalition games, and then we survey its
latest applications, in particular, the interference mitigation and
traffic offloading. Different from most of the current applications,
we concentrate on the cooperative incentive mechanism design
since the node cooperation always means resource consumption
and other costs. Moreover, for the incentive mechanism, a cooper-
ative spectrum leasing is introduced. To mitigate the interference
and balance traffic, we propose two schemes under the presented
framework: interference alignment with spectrum leasing (IASL)
and traffic offloading with spectrum leasing (TOSL). Simulation
results show the improved performance of the cooperative gains
using the proposed IASL and TOSL schemes.
Index Terms—Coalition game; 5G; Interference alignment;
Incentive mechanism; Traffic offloading; Ultra-dense networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The 5G mobile communication systems should be spec-
trum and energy efficient to realize the 1000-fold capacity
improvement in a cost-effective way. Internet of things (IoT)
and mobile Internet are becoming the main driving forces.
Exponential growth in data traffic, billions of connections, and
densification of small cells are the main characteristics that a
fully mobile and connected community demands. Ultra-dense
networks (UDNs) underlaying macrocells are identified as one
of the best means to improve the system capacity, extend
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the coverage, and enhance the quality of experience (QoE)
of subscribers.
However, the problems of interference and traffic imbalance
limit the achievable performance and the capabilities of the
heterogeneous small cells. For instance, most subscribers will
associate to the macrocell due to the larger downlink power,
even if the subscribers are close to a specific small cell, thus
fewer users associate to small cells. Therefore, the potential
capabilities of small cells cannot be fully exploited due to their
intrinsic characteristics, e.g., the small cells’ lower downlink
power and less antenna gains [1], [2]. This leads to a serious
traffic imbalance problem. Meanwhile, the intensive deploy-
ment of small cells produces a severe interference problem
with the limited spectrum resources in the hotspots.
Although interference and traffic imbalance problems will
be more serious with a huge number of small cells, there
exist more cooperation opportunities among them. Cooperative
diversity gains can be exploited by forming potential cooper-
ative coalitions to well deal with these technical problems.
Extensive cooperative framework and technology have been
studied to improve the cooperation gains, e.g., overlapping
coalition framework, coordinated multiple points transmis-
sion/reception (CoMP), and cell range expansion (CRE). How-
ever, cooperation and coordination always mean additional
resource consumption and other related cost, such as power
consumption, necessary information interaction, and signaling
overhead. Therefore, it is important to design a suitable
incentive mechanism to motivate such cooperative coalition
formation.
In this article, the cooperative behaviors of the small cells
are characterized by introducing a coalition game-theoretic
framework, and thus exploring these cooperative benefits
and diversity gains. Although coalition games have found
applications in wireless communication networks, an incentive
mechanism is important to form the cooperative coalitions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A
summary of the technical challenges and opportunities is given
in section II. Section III presents the basics of a coalition game.
In section IV, we briefly introduce a cooperative framework
with an incentive mechanism. In section V, two applications
of the proposed coalition game framework with an incentive
mechanism are presented with simulation results showing the
performance gains. The article is concluded in section VI.
2II. TECHNICAL CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: NODE
COOPERATION AND COOPERATIVE GAME
Heterogeneous UDNs with node cooperation are recognized
as the most powerful 5G framework trends for both the
mobile Internet [3], [4] and IoT [5]. For instance, the c-radio
access network, where c stands for centralized, collaborative
and cloud, and CoMP technologies, has been applied to
improve network performance and achieve load balance [1],
[7]. To optimize the utilization of densely deployed nodes and
smoothly advance towards 5G networks, an Internet-oriented
architecture of mobile networks is proposed in [3]. Meanwhile,
authors in [4] point out that UDNs are the new paradigm with
network cooperation and availability of higher density of radio
nodes. To reduce the cost, device-to-device communications
can offload the network and ensure the ubiquity of high quality
services. In addition, to meet the technical and economical
requirements of exponentially growing machine-type commu-
nications (MTC), authors in [5] advocated the use of small
cells to handle the massive and dense MTC rollout. These
call for a cooperative framework for the 5G heterogeneous
UDNs to meet the trends for both the mobile Internet [3], [4]
and the IoT [5].
1) Technical Interference and Traffic Imbalance Chal-
lenges: We concentrate on traffic imbalance and mutual in-
terference to enhance both energy and spectrum efficiency.
The spectrum resources are scarce and valuable, and resource
coordination has been well studied from academia, industry,
and standardized bodies [1].
There are two kinds of interference management schemes
including resource coordination-based and interference-
oriented ones. On one hand, the resource coordination-based
scheme at the transmitter side [11], [12] will try to avoid in-
terference by partially orthogonally allocating or fully reusing
the spectrum resources, which can be implemented in fre-
quency, time, space, and power domains, such as almost
blank subframes, CoMP and enhanced inter-cell interference
coordination (eICIC). On the other hand, there are interference
cancellation techniques at the receiver side, for instance,
successive interference cancellation [9] and IA [10]. These
kinds of interference mitigation schemes will reconstruct the
interference or exploit the interference characteristics from
the spacial perspective like zero-forcing precoding, and then
eliminate it [11].
The above inter- and intra-tier interference problems also
result in traffic imbalance problems, because of the featured
different downlink powers and antenna gains. That is, most of
the small cells underlaying macrocells cannot be effectively
associated due to the much larger downlink power and antenna
gains of macrocells. During the past decades, various schemes
for traffic offloading have been proposed or standardized, for
instance, mobility load balancing (MLB) [2], CRE, capacity
offloading [13], [14], and dynamic association.
2) Potential Node Cooperative Opportunities: Network co-
operative methodologies have found extensive applications in
both interference mitigating and energy saving. In fact, inter-
ference management schemes such as eICIC, CoMP and IA,
and traffic offloading schemes such as MLB are implemented
among different cells involving the cooperation among them.
Cooperative diversity gains have great potentials for reducing
energy consumption of mobile users [2]. However, different
players are diverse with heterogeneous properties including the
capabilities of QoE provisions, rationality towards preference,
and dynamic association behaviors. That is why the coopera-
tive game theory has been widely applied to model, analyze,
and explore these cooperative diversity gains, characterize
behaviors of rational players, and design distributed algorithms
[8].
3) Cooperative Games: In general, bargaining games and
coalition games are two types of cooperative games, which
have extensive applications. Classical bargaining games de-
scribe the bargaining process to agree on a cooperation proto-
col [6], while coalition games describe the coalitions formed
by cooperative groups of players [8]. However, motivating
cooperation among different cells means additional resource
consumption and other related performance cost. Therefore,
it is important to design a suitable incentive mechanism to
motivate such cooperative coalitions.
III. COALITION GAME THEORY
The basics of a coalition game is introduced in this sec-
tion, where we concentrate on the basic concepts, principles,
characteristics, classifications, and solutions.
In principle, coalition games contain a set of players, and
they aim to strengthen their positions by forming cooperative
coalitions. The optimal strategic decision-making and the
dynamic behaviors of each player in the game always interact
with each other. Different from non-cooperative games in
which players independently pursue their own payoff maxi-
mization or cost minimization in a selfish manner, players in
coalitional games emphasize social optimality and rationality
to optimize the payoff distributions among different players.
Meanwhile, coalition games concentrate on system efficiency
and individual fairness among different players. In addition
to these interactive and social rational players, the coalition
value is another key concept of a coalitional game, which
quantifies the value of a coalition. If the coalition value can be
represented by a scalar featured function, then the coalitional
games are named as the coalitional games with transferable
utilities. This kind of scalar featured function is also called
the characteristic function or payoff function, which quantifies
the value of each coalition.
The form and type of a game are determined by the
definition of the coalition value. Nevertheless, a coalition game
is determined uniquely, independent of the value definition.
Along with the category of coalitional games with transferable
utility, depending on whether the payoff function is impacted
by the other members from other coalitions, thus resulting
in the characteristic games and formation games. For the
former, the coalition payoff of the characteristic games is
solely determined by the members in the considered coalition,
and it is not dependent on the other members from any other
coalition. In practice, formation games are most popular due
to the existing interactions among different players.
Coalitional graph games, coalition formation games and
canonical coalitional games are introduced from their potential
3applications in wireless communication networks [8]. Differ-
ent solutions including core, Shapley value, and nucleolus are
presented assuming that the grand coalition is formed be-
cause of super-additive property. However, coalition formation
games intend to provide solutions to what is the optimal size
of coalition subjected to changes in the number of players
in the coalition and physical constraints. In the following
sections, we concentrate on the coalition formation games with
characteristics of no super-additive property in the partition
form, and we also concentrate on the cost effects on forming
coalitions.
IV. COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK WITH AN INCENTIVE
MECHANISM
In this section, we first survey the recent applications of
coalition games. Then, we summarize the motivations of
introducing incentive mechanism design, which includes the
IA [10], inter-tier traffic offloading and spectrum leasing.
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Fig. 1. Cooperative framework with an incentive mechanism with IA and
traffic offload as two applications.
A heterogeneous UDN is illustrated in Fig. 1. For instance,
in a crowded stadium or an open-air assembly, one can expect
intensive deployment of multiple small cells evolved base
stations (SeNBs), such as the femtocell base stations, microcell
base stations, picocell base stations, and so on. SeNBs are
assumed to fully share the frequency resources licensed to
the macrocell evolved base station (MeNB). In addition, we
assume that both MeNB, SeNBs, and their associated user
equipment, for instance, small cell user equipment (SUEs), and
macrocell user equipment (MUE) are with multiple antennas.
There exist both inter-tier interference between SeNBs and
MeNB, and intra-tier interference among different SeNBs.
The UDN leads to a more complex intra- and inter-tier in-
terference and traffic offloading, which enormously affects the
network performance and user experience. Different SeNBs
and MeNB can form cooperative coalitions, which include
homogeneous and heterogeneous coalitions, to mitigate inter-
ference and offload traffic according to the revenue and the
traffic situation of the adjacent interfering SeNBs, such as the
{SeNB3, SeNB4} and {MeNB, SeNB5} in Fig. 1. Moreover,
the spectrum leasing is shown in Fig. 1. We normalize each
time-slot to one unit in length and divide it into three phases.
In phase I, only the MeNB transmits its packets to the MUE
with the length αβ; In phase II, the MeNB and SeNBs simul-
taneously transmit with a coordinated transmission with the
length α(1−β). In phase III, the MeNB stops its transmission
and leases the spectrum to the related coalition of SeNBs
with the length (1 − α), where SeNBs transmit using the
distributed IA. With these implementations, the cooperation of
the coalition has brought much corresponding benefits, such
as the enhancement of spectrum efficiency by heterogeneous
coalitions and the interference avoidance by the homogeneous
coalitions.
A. Interference Alignment
IA is a powerful interference mitigation technique. It in-
volves the coordination among different antennas of one node,
or different virtual multiple antennas of multiple nodes. Basics
of IA can be summarized as follows: the transmitter pre-codes
the message using the channel state information at the receiver
side, and the beam forming is implemented to suppress the
interference. The interference coming from a different trans-
mitter is forced to be aligned in particular dimensions of a
signal such that the remaining dimensions become free of
interference, thus improving the system performance.
In Fig. 1, different non-cooperative SeNBs are experiencing
strong intra-tier interference. If IA is implemented, then the
intra-tier interference will be mitigated, thus cooperatively im-
proving the spectrum efficiency. Most of the current literature
is researched from the signal processing perspective, and they
focus on how to design the effective pre-codes [9]. However,
there lacks an efficient coordination between the transmitter
and the interferer, e.g., the antennas or the virtually cooperative
nodes. It is also necessary to answer the questions of who
will participate in the interference alignment coalition and
why? How about the performance metric involving coalition
formation cost, the interference-aware, the received signal
strength indication (RSSI) or the location-based?
Coalition formation games have found several applications
to answer these questions. For instance, a coalition game was
used to formulate the SeNBs’ cooperative behaviors in [9],
where the IA techniques are implemented by the cooperative
SeNBs to enhance their transmission rate in each coalition.
The payoff function encapsulates the profit from cooperation
with regard to an increased data rate and the cost with regard
to pilot signal transmission power during channel estimation.
In this article, we jointly concentrate on two kinds of inter-
ference management schemes including resource coordination-
based [11] and interference-oriented ones [9], [10], which have
been separately studied. In this article, we will jointly design
the interference management in the coalition games with an
incentive mechanism.
B. Inter-Tier Traffic Offloading
Observed from the Fig. 1, if the SeNB5 is in the open
access mode, then the MUE can be offloaded to the SeNB5
with a effectively received power and a weaken interference
power. This will significantly improve the SINR performance
of the MUE, and as payback, the MeNB can lease parts of
its channels. Traffic offloading is one of the best ways to
4solve the traffic imbalance problem between the macrocell and
small cells. Traffic offloading always involves the problems of
what should be offloaded, where to offload, and so on. This
process can be modeled as a game of different players, e.g.,
the macrocell and small cells.
The authors in [13] proposed an energy-aware traffic of-
floading method between multiple SeNBs and MeNB, which
was modeled as a Nash bargaining game. To attain an optimal
win-win for both SeNBs and MeNB, mutual interference
compensation, interference-related right selected target-SeNB
and an energy-aware trigger of source-MeNB were provided in
[13], which helped to attain more dimensions of cooperation
gains and diversity. In [14], to model data offloading, a
queuing-theoretic model was formulated with the elastic data
flows notion, or more explicitly, cell range expansion together
with inter-cell interference coordination. However, as the delay
increases, the users’ satisfaction sharply decreases.
In summary, coalition formation games study and analyze
the behaviors and interactions among nodes during various
kinds of cooperation and coordination, which also facilitate the
self-organizing, decentralized, and autonomic networks. How-
ever, motivating cooperation among different nodes means ad-
ditional resource consumption and other related performance
cost. Therefore, it is important to design a suitable incentive
mechanism to motivate such cooperative coalitions. In this
article, we present a coalition game-theoretic framework to
characterize the cooperative behaviors with the spectrum leas-
ing as the incentive mechanism.
C. Spectrum Leasing as an Incentive Mechanism
Spectrum leasing is used as advanced spectrum resource
coordination to improve the spectrum efficiency; meanwhile,
it can improve spectrum utilization flexibility. By now, three
dimensions of spectrum leasing have been studied from fre-
quency channel, time slot, and spatial perspectives [12]. For
instance, the spectrum leasing was proposed as the incentive
mechanism to motivate the SeNBs for open access to offload
traffic of MeNB in [12]. In return, the MeNB would coor-
dinate the downlink power to relieve the interference as the
compensation to the SeNBs. A coalitional game framework
was proposed between the MeNB and the SeNBs, where a
small cell user may act as a relay for the macrocell users. In
return, each cooperative macrocell user grants the small cell
user a fraction of its superframe.
V. TWO APPLICATIONS WITH INCENTIVE MECHANISM
A. IA with Spectrum Leasing (IASL)
Both inter- and intra-tier interference enormously reduce the
performance and hinder the intensive deployment of the net-
work. Promisingly, various kinds of technologies are studied to
mitigate the interference at the transmitter or the receiver side.
With the development of advanced cooperation networking
paradigms, the nodes can form clusters by cooperating to co-
ordinate their transmission with some sustainable constraints.
Moreover, many studies lack the motivation to drive the
cooperation among nodes. Thus, the spectrum leasing was
combined as the incentive mechanism to boost the cooperation
to perform IA.
1) Details of Proposed IASL Scheme: We present a joint
resource management and IA scheme to optimize the revenue
of each small cell, the pseudo-code can be found in algorithm
1. We consider the downlink transmission of an Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) macrocell
network such as an LTE advanced macro-cell. Initially, the
initial coalitional structure consists of non-cooperative SeNBs.
All SeNBs fully share the spectrum of the MeNB and transmit
with the maximum power. Firstly, all SeNBs collect the refer-
ence signal receiving powers (RSRPs) and the cell identifier
(ID) from the neighboring SeNBs by their respective UEs.
Based on the collected information, each SeNB constructs the
interference list in a decreasing sequence. Then, each SeNB
computes the current utility u, where the utility u is a scalar
function of the SeNB’ total transmission rate.
From the top of the list, each SeNB computes the coopera-
tion cost c = vσ
2
η , where c is the cost of power consumption
that SeNB transmit a pilot tone to the farthest SeNB’s SUE of
the coalition. The terms v, σ2, and η are the SINR threshold,
the background noise power, and the channel gain between
the SeNB with its farthest coalition SeNB, respectively. Each
SeNB selects the potential cooperator from the top of the list
to coordinate their transmissions by comparing the revenue
and the cost. When the IA conditions are satisfied [9], the
SeNB proposes cooperation with interfering SeNB. Next,
MeNB determines to implement the spectrum leasing and
power control. Here, the revenue of SeNB is defined as
U = wfp(RS) − C0P , where the revenue is defined as the
data transmission benefits minus the leasing payment. The
term w is a weight factor to tradeoff the benefits and payment,
and fp(x) is the function of SeNB user with respect to data
transmissions. RS = α(1 − β)RII + (1 − α)RIII , RII and
RIII are the SeNB’ transmission rate in the phase II and
the phase III of the spectrum leasing process. The detail of
spectrum leasing process refers to the description in Fig. 1.
C0 is the unit price for SeNB’s power. This function can be
approximated as a convex function by fixing other parameters,
then the leasing coefficient α, β and transmitted power P can
be solved, respectively. Finally, each coalition implements the
corresponding operation, including IA and spectrum leasing,
to improve the performance.
2) Simulation Results: Simulation is conducted using Mat-
lab 2014b to assess the performance of the proposed IASL
algorithm. We consider a heterogeneous cellular network,
where multiple small cells are randomly distributed within a
single hexagonal macrocell with a radius of 1Km. The number
of small cells is 50-300. The maximum downlink transmission
powers are 46dBm and 20dBm for the macrocell and small
cells, respectively. Here we use the femtocell as one example.
Certainly, the proposed scheme can be extended to other
types of small cells, for instance, the picocells. We assumed
both the nodes and user equipments are with 4 antennas,
which can help to well apply powerful interference mitigation
capabilities of IA. Meanwhile, each femtocell only serves one
user in the closed access way. The distance dependent path
loss shadowing affects the transmissions according to 3GPP
specifications [15].
Fig. 2 illustrates the improved cooperative gains of the pre-
5Algorithm 1 IA with spectrum leasing (IASL)
Initialization: The initial coalitional structure consists of
non-cooperative SeNBs. Full frequency multiplexing and
maximum power transfer are assumed.
1: repeat
Phase 1: Coalition Formation
2: for each SeNB do
3: Construct the interference list by the collected RSRPs
from neighboring SeNBs.
4: Compute the current utility u.
5: for each interfering SeNBs do
6: Compute the cost c and the potential utility of the
cooperation with interference SeNB.
7: if the utility is increasing and satisfy the IA condi-
tions.




12: until Converge to a stable coalition structure
Phase 2: Inter-Coalition Spectrum Leasing
13: for each coalition S do
14: Obtain α, β and P ∗ by solve the optimization revenue
problem.
15: Implements the corresponding operation, including IA
and spectrum leasing.
16: end for
Output: An efficient and stabilized coalition structure.
sented IASL scheme compared to that of the non-cooperation
scheme. The non-cooperation scheme is implemented among
the SeNBs without the resource coordination and spectrum
leasing.
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Fig. 2. Performance gain achieved by the proposed IASL scheme.
In Fig. 2, we describe the average performance gain with
regard to the increasing number of small cells in the unit of
node number/km2. The average performance gain is defined
as the ratio of the achieved performance before and after the
implementations of the investigated schemes. The proposed
IASL scheme can always obtain better performance compared
to that of the non-cooperative scheme. However, the increasing
rate of the gain decreases with the increasing number of small
cells. Meanwhile, with the SINR threshold v increasing, the
average performance gain is more obvious.
B. Traffic Offloading with Spectrum Leasing (TOSL)
To mitigate the interference and balance the traffic, we
provide another application of the formulated framework. The
basic idea is small cells offloading parts of macrocell users,
and in return, the macrocell should lease parts of its spectrum
to the selected small cells in the partially shared channel
deployment case. Therefore, we should solve the problems of
how to formulate the coalition between macrocell and small
cells, and how to implement the traffic offloading and spectrum
leasing techniques in the formulated coalitions.
1) Details of Proposed TOSL Scheme: Different from the
last application of the formulated coalition game-theoretic
framework, and the coalition formation here is with respect
to each channel. For each channel, we implement algorithm
2. Here, we also consider the downlink transmission of an
OFDMA macrocell network, where multiple small cells are
deployed. Initially, the initial coalition structure consists of the
non-cooperative SeNBs and MeNB. All SeNBs partially share
the orthogonal downlink channels of the MeNB. Meanwhile,
SeNBs and the MeNB transmit the data via the maximum
downlink power. Then, each MUE observes the interfering
SeNBs that reuse the same subchannel and reports them to
the MeNB. The MeNB constructs the interference list of the
SeNBs in different subchannel. Based on the interference list,
the MeNB negotiates with the SeNBs from the top of the
list that whether to cooperate or not when compared to the




the revenue is the net utility function between the achievable
transmission rate and the average delay, where we still define
the utility as the achievable transmission rate. R is a function
of achieved rate related to α, β and ψ, where the terms α,
and β are the coefficient of spectrum leasing, the term ψ
is the coalition structure. D and δ are the time delay and
the tradeoff factor between the rate and the delay. If the
revenue is increasing, the corresponding MUE is offloaded to
the SeNB. Next, the SeNB will be leased to the time-slotted
channel. Here, the whole time slot of a specific channel is
assumed to be one unit "1". Then 1 − α is licensed to the
MeNB, and α is partially shared between the MeNB and the
SeNBs; this revenue function is also a convex function, that
can be solved by the convex optimization. Finally, a stabilized
coalition partition is reached.
2) Simulation and Numerical Results: Similar to the simu-
lation setup of the proposed IASL algorithm, we verified the
improved performance of the proposed TOSL scheme, where
we used multiple small cells underlying the only macrocell as
an example. We set the scenario as if there exist one small cell
user associated with the small cell, which is used to simulate
the traffic unbalance case and guarantees that all the femtocells
can be the new associators selected by the specific macrocell
users.
Fig. 3 illustrates the performance gain, where we use the
non-cooperative one as the benchmark. Here, non-cooperative
means that there is no coordination implementation between
the macrocell and small cells. Meanwhile, we set two cases
with different numbers of MUEs served by the macrocell when
implementing the proposed TOSL scheme.
6Algorithm 2 Traffic offloading with spectrum leasing (TOSL)
Initialization: The initial coalitional structure consists of
non-cooperative SeNBs and MeNB. Each SeNBs partially
share the orthogonal downlink channels of MeNB and
maximum power transfer is assumed.
1: repeat
Phase 1: Coalition Formation
2: for each sub-channel do
3: MeNB constructs the interference list by the collected
RSRPs.
4: for all interference SeNB do
5: MeNB negotiations with interference SeNBs, and
compute the revenue pi.
6: if the revenue is increasing
7: MeNB cooperates with the SeNBs and offloads the




11: until Convergence to a stable coalition structure.
Phase 2: Traffic Offloading and Spectrum Leasing
12: for each coalition do
13: MeNB computes α and β, and implements the operation
of spectrum leasing.
14: end for
Output: A stabilized coalition partition.
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The Proposed TOSL 100 MUEs
The Proposed TOSL 200 MUEs
Fig. 3. Performance gain achieved by the proposed TOSL scheme.
We conclude from Fig. 3, that, the performance gain first
increases and then decreases as the number of small cells
increases, but TOSL can always achieve the performance
improvement compared to the non-cooperative one. This is
mainly due to the fact that there are limited available channels.
Second, the performance gain is better when more MUEs
are served by the macrocell. It is mainly because that more
MUEs means more opportunities of traffic offloading to the
femtocells. Meanwhile, we have assumed that each femtocell
only serves one user, which means that all the offloaded MUEs
can be re-associated with the femtocells.
VI. CONCLUSION
To mitigate interference and balance traffic, we turned
to cooperative games to explore the full cooperative gains
among nodes. We presented the basics of coalition game
and surveyed the latest applications. Moreover, we noted
that cooperative incentive mechanism design was critical to
form a suitable cooperative cluster, and thus we presented
the cooperative framework with the spectrum leasing as the
incentive mechanism. We also proposed schemes of IASL
and TOSL under the presented framework. Simulation results
verify the performance efficiency and show the improved
performance of the proposed IASL and TOSL schemes. The
presented framework can be extended to the non-orthogonal
multiple access case and cognitive networks.
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